Çünkü yalnızca Türkiye'de değil, dünyada hanehalkları ve finansal-olmayan şirketler, yani finansal-olmayan özel sektör kaldıraç düşürüyor. Kısmen gönüllü olarak, kısmen de yeni borç bulamadığından. Böyle olduğunda da hükümet borcu artıyor. Olanı bizim makaledeki özetle IMF'nin ağzından dinleyin:
Possibly also because World War II led to a
deep private debt deleveraging of households and non-financial firms, and
therefore non-financial private sectors of many countries started their journey
after the end of World War II at low debt levels, majority of the
first-tradition economists had concerned themselves mostly with public debt
without paying much attention to private debt, at least, from the end of World
War II until the onset of the GFC in the summer of 2007. The GFC that started
in the summer of 2007 changed that. Now there is a burgeoning literature also among
the first-tradition economists on the dangers of the excessive debt leverage of
the non-financial private sector as documented by Mbaye, Moreno-Badia and Chae
(2018, 2019). Mbaye, Moreno-Badia and Chae (2019) opened their article as
follows.
"The
Global Crisis, along with ravaging the world economy, has awoken economists to
the dangers of unchecked private debt. Excessive private leverage has been
linked in recent papers to increased risks of financial crises (Schularick and
Taylor 2012), weaker recoveries (Mian et al. 2013), and lower medium-term
growth (Mian et al. 2017)."
Comprehensive lists of papers by
first-tradition economists on the subject are given in Mbaye, Moreno-Badia and
Chae (2018) and Mbaye, Moreno-Badia and Chae (2019). It is evident from their
papers, the papers they cited and others that the first-tradition economists
have been unaware of the works of the second-tradition economists on the
subject.
Building on the IMF Global Debt Database
(GDD)—by far the richest dataset for the analysis of indebtedness when compared
to those of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
Bank of International Settlements (BIS), International Institute of Finance
(IIF), and McKinsey—comprising debts of the public and private non-financial
sectors for an unbalanced panel of 190 countries dating back to 1950, Mbaye,
Moreno-Badia and Chae (2018) document a recurring pattern where households and
firms are forced to deleverage in the face of a debt overhang, dampening
growth, and eliciting injection of public money to kick start the economy.
They observe that this substitution of public
for private debt takes place whether the private debt deleveraging concludes
with a financial crisis or not, and deduce that this is not just a crisis story
but a more prevalent phenomenon that affects countries of various stages of
financial and economic development. They also find that whenever the
non-financial private sector is caught in a debt overhang and needs to
deleverage, governments come to the rescue through a countercyclical rise in
government deficit and debt, and that if the non-financial private sector
deleveraging concludes with a financial crisis, "this other form of bailout,
not the bank rescue packages, should bear most of the blame for the increasing
debt levels in advanced economies."
Finally, Mbaye, Moreno-Badia and Chae (2018)
note that their results suggest that private debt deleveraging happens before
one can see it in the non-financial private debt to Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) ratio.
