İşte bunu biz de önereceğiz. Küresel servet vergisi

Abolish the billionaries?

Yani borç silmek yetmez. Yüklerin de paylaşılması gerek. Bu yüzden, kademeli bir servet vergisi gerekli.

Sürdürülebilir kapitalizm modası. Bu yeni bir moda.

Sürdürülebilir Piyasalar Girişimi

İngilizce yazı. Bir okuyun neler diyorlar. Onlar da olanın sürdürülmez olduğunun farkındalar. Ama hala piyasalar diyorlar. Ne demek sürdürülebilir piyasalar? Sistemik bir değişiklik, bir devrim gerek. Ama benim pek umudum yok. Yerine savaşlar gelecek. Gidişat o gibi duruyor.

Biz buna küresel borç krizi diyoruz.

Borç krizi

Küresel borç yine rekor kırmış. Bu borçlar ödenemez. Önemli bir kısmının silinmesi gerek. Şu videoya bir daha bakın isterseniz.

Türkiye'de bütçe açığı büyüyor. Son derece normal.

Çünkü yalnızca Türkiye'de değil, dünyada hanehalkları ve finansal-olmayan şirketler, yani finansal-olmayan özel sektör kaldıraç düşürüyor. Kısmen gönüllü olarak, kısmen de yeni borç bulamadığından. Böyle olduğunda da hükümet borcu artıyor. Olanı bizim makaledeki özetle IMF'nin ağzından dinleyin:

Possibly also because World War II led to a deep private debt deleveraging of households and non-financial firms, and therefore non-financial private sectors of many countries started their journey after the end of World War II at low debt levels, majority of the first-tradition economists had concerned themselves mostly with public debt without paying much attention to private debt, at least, from the end of World War II until the onset of the GFC in the summer of 2007. The GFC that started in the summer of 2007 changed that. Now there is a burgeoning literature also among the first-tradition economists on the dangers of the excessive debt leverage of the non-financial private sector as documented by Mbaye, Moreno-Badia and Chae (2018, 2019). Mbaye, Moreno-Badia and Chae (2019) opened their article as follows.

"The Global Crisis, along with ravaging the world economy, has awoken economists to the dangers of unchecked private debt. Excessive private leverage has been linked in recent papers to increased risks of financial crises (Schularick and Taylor 2012), weaker recoveries (Mian et al. 2013), and lower medium-term growth (Mian et al. 2017)."

Comprehensive lists of papers by first-tradition economists on the subject are given in Mbaye, Moreno-Badia and Chae (2018) and Mbaye, Moreno-Badia and Chae (2019). It is evident from their papers, the papers they cited and others that the first-tradition economists have been unaware of the works of the second-tradition economists on the subject.

Building on the IMF Global Debt Database (GDD)—by far the richest dataset for the analysis of indebtedness when compared to those of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Bank of International Settlements (BIS), International Institute of Finance (IIF), and McKinsey—comprising debts of the public and private non-financial sectors for an unbalanced panel of 190 countries dating back to 1950, Mbaye, Moreno-Badia and Chae (2018) document a recurring pattern where households and firms are forced to deleverage in the face of a debt overhang, dampening growth, and eliciting injection of public money to kick start the economy.

They observe that this substitution of public for private debt takes place whether the private debt deleveraging concludes with a financial crisis or not, and deduce that this is not just a crisis story but a more prevalent phenomenon that affects countries of various stages of financial and economic development. They also find that whenever the non-financial private sector is caught in a debt overhang and needs to deleverage, governments come to the rescue through a countercyclical rise in government deficit and debt, and that if the non-financial private sector deleveraging concludes with a financial crisis, "this other form of bailout, not the bank rescue packages, should bear most of the blame for the increasing debt levels in advanced economies."

Finally, Mbaye, Moreno-Badia and Chae (2018) note that their results suggest that private debt deleveraging happens before one can see it in the non-financial private debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio.

Ekonomistler bu konuyu bir düşünsünler: Hazine tahvillerinin önemi

This is where the Treasury comes in. The Treasury provides most of the collaterals acceptable to the Central Bank through which the Central Bank creates most of the reserves. Further, the Treasury maintains the account from which it makes its payments at the Central Bank in all countries, although it may maintain accounts at some designated commercial banks also (see Yaker and Pattanayak 2010). We should mention that, leaving aside the questions of why and since when, the Central Bank currently cannot directly lend to or directly purchase securities from the Treasury in any country. The "central bank independence" reigns supreme by law, although not necessarily in practice.

Other than banks and the Treasury, there usually are a few other entities that are allowed to maintain deposit accounts at the Central Bank in every country, not to mention foreign central banks. All deposits other than bank deposits at the Central Bank, including reverse repurchase liabilities, drain reserves if they go up. In other words, all deposits other than bank deposits at the Central Bank should be viewed as a fourth type of money, since changes in their balances impact reserves, that is, base money, so that they should be managed in order not to create liquidity problems in the domestic banking system (see, for example, Pozsar 2019).

We conclude this section with the following observations.

1) When the Treasury sells its bonds to the non-bank rest, there is no new money creation. Only existing money changes hands, and if that money gets deposited in the TSA, equal amounts of reserves and deposits get extinguished. Likewise when tax payments get deposited in the TSA.  But after the Treasury spends the deposited amount, both base money  and broad money come back to where they were before, keeping everything else constant.

2) When the Treasury sells its bonds to banks, three things may happen.

a) If there are banks at which the Treasury can maintain deposit accounts with or without restrictions, or there are no such banks and only those banks at which the Treasury cannot maintain deposits accounts purchase the Treasury bonds, then these banks buy the Treasury bonds by borrowing from the Central Bank against which the Central Bank increases the balance of the TSA. After the Treasury spends the balance, an equal amount of base and broad money get created.

 b) If there are banks at which the Treasury can maintain deposit accounts without restrictions and only those banks at which the Treasury can maintain deposit accounts without restrictions purchase the Treasury bonds, then new broad money gets created as usual. But since the Treasury has to spend only from the TSA, the result is the same as above.

c) If there are banks at which the Treasury can maintain deposit accounts with restrictions and only these banks purchase the Treasury bonds, then a combination of the above two happens.

These observations mean that whether the Treasury sells some bonds to banks or the same amount directly to the Central Bank (or the Central Bank loans the same amount to the Treasury), the changes in the base and broad money are the same after the Treasury spends the amount, keeping everything else constant. The latter is, of course, cheaper for the Treasury because the Central Bank has to pay a large percentage of its profits to the Treasury in every country, whereas the banks, generally, do not.

Bekri Mustafa

Zeyno

Şimdi Zeynep, Türk mü, Kürt mü, Ermeni mi, Rum mu?

Ya da Zeynep, Müslüman mı, Hristiyan mı, Yahudi mi, Hindu mu?

Ben şu kadarını biliyorum.

Zeynep hasta. Sağ gözü fena halde iltihaplı. O gözü gidebilir.

Yani, mesela, Zeynep Yahudi ya da Ermeni olsa, o haline bırakayım da sağ gözü kör mü olsa?