Matematikçi Gözüyle
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Sunday, May 03, 2020
Sunday, April 12, 2020
The Use and Abuse of MMT
The Use and Abuse of MMT
By Michael
Hudson, with Dirk Bezemer, Steve Keen and T. Sabri Öncü
Michael
Hudson is a research professor of Economics at University of Missouri, Kansas
City, and a research associate at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.
His latest book is “and forgive them their debts”:
Lending, Foreclosure and Redemption from Bronze Age Finance to the Jubilee Year
Dirk
Bezemer is a Professor of Economics at the University of Groningen in The
Netherlands
Steve
Keen is a Professor and Distinguished Research Fellow at the Institute
for Strategy, Resilience and Security of University College London (www.isrs.org.uk). He blogs at https://www.patreon.com/ProfSteveKeen
T.
Sabri Öncü (sabri.oncu@gmail.com) is an economist based in İstanbul, Turkey
Summary
After being attacked by monetarists and others for many decades, MMT
and the idea that running government budget deficit is stabilizing instead of
destabilizing is suddenly gaining applause from the parts of the political
spectrum that long opposed MMT: the banking and financial sector, especially
the Republicans. But what is applauded is in many ways something quite different than the leading MMT advocates have long supported.
Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) was developed to explain the logic of
running government budget deficits to increase demand in the economy’s
consumption and capital investment sectors so as to maintain full employment.
But the enormous U.S. federal budget deficits from the Obama bank bailout after
the 2008 crash through the Trump tax cuts and Coronavirus financial bailout
have not pumped money into the economy to finance new direct investment,
employment, rising wages and living standards. Instead, government money
creation and Quantitative Easing has been directed to the finance, insurance
and real estate (FIRE) sectors. The result is a travesty of MMT, not its original
aim.
By subsidizing the financial sector and its debt overhead, this
policy is deflationary instead of supporting the “real” economy. The effect has
been to empower the banking sector, whose product is credit and debt creation
that has taken an unproductive and indeed extractive form.
This can clearly be seen by dividing the private sector into two
parts: The “real” economy of production and consumption is wrapped in a
financial web of debt and rent extraction – real estate rent, monopoly rent and
financial debt creation. Recognizing this breakdown is essential to distinguish
between positive government deficit spending that helps maintain employment and
rising living standards, as compared to “captured” government spending to
subsidize the FIRE sector’s extraction and debt deflation leading to chronic
austerity.
Origins and policy aims of MMT
MMT was developed
to explain the monetary logic in running budget deficits to support aggregate
demand. This logic was popularized in the 1930s by Keynes, base on his idea of
a circular flow between employers and wage-earners. Deficit spending was seen
as providing public employment and hence consumer spending to absorb enough
production to enable the economy to keep producing at a profit. The policy goal
was to maintain (or recover) reasonably full employment.
But production and
consumption are not the entire economy. Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) was formally
developed in the 1990s, with roots that can be traced by Abba Lerner’s theory
of functional finance, and by Hyman Minsky and others seeking to integrate the
financial sector into the overall economic system in a more realistic and
functional way than the Chicago School’s monetarist approach on the right wing
of the political spectrum. A key point in its revival was Warren Mosler’s
insight that a currency-issuing country does not “tax to spend”, but instead
must spend before its citizens can pay tax in that currency.
MMT was also Post-Keynesian
in the sense of advocating government budget deficits as a means of pumping
purchasing power into the economy to achieve full-employment. Elaboration of
this approach showed how such deficits created stability instead of the
instability that results from private-sector debt dynamics. At an extreme, this
approach held that recessions could be cured simply by deficit spending. Yet
despite the enormous deficit spending by the U.S. and Eurozone in the wake of
the 2008 crash, the overall economy continued to stagnate; only the financial
and real estate markets boomed.
At issue was the
role of government in the economy. The major opponents of public enterprise and
infrastructure, of budget deficits and market regulation, was the financial
sector. “Austrian” and Chicago-style monetary theorists strongly opposed MMT, asserting
that government budget deficits would be inflationary, citing Germany’s Weimar
inflation of the 1920s, and Zimbabwe, and portraying government deficits (and
indeed, active government programs and regulation) as “interference” with “free
markets.”
MMTers pointed out
that running a budget surplus, or even a balanced budget, absorbed income from
the economy, thereby shrinking demand for goods and services and leading to
unemployment. Without government deficits, the economy would be obliged to rely
on private-sector banks for the credit needed to grow.
That occurred in
the United States in the final years of the Clinton administration when it
actually ran a budget surplus. But with a public sector surplus, there had to
be a corresponding and indeed identical private sector deficit. So the effect
of that policy was to leave either private debt financing or a trade surplus as
the only ways in which economic growth could obtain the monetary support that
was needed. This built in structural claims for interest and amortization that
were deflationary, ultimately leading to the political imposition of debt
deflation and economic austerity after the 2008 debt crisis.
Republican and financial sector opposition to budget
deficits and MMT
If governments do
not provide enough purchasing power by running budget deficits to enable the
economy to grow, the role of providing money and credit will have to be relinquished
to banks – at interest, and for purposes that the banks decide on (mainly,
loans to buy real estate, stocks and bonds). In this respect banks are
competitors with government over who will provide the economy’s money and
credit – and for what purposes.
Banks want the
government out of the way – not only regarding money creation, but also for financial
and price policies, tax policy and laws governing corporate behavior. Finance
wants to appropriate public monopolies, by taking payment in natural resources
or basic public infrastructure when governments are, by policy rather than
necessity, short of their own money, or of foreign exchange. (In times past,
this required warfare; today foreign debt is the main lever.)
To get into this
position, banks need to block governments from creating their own money. The
result is a conflict between private bank credit and public money creation.
Public money is created for social purposes, primarily to maintain production
and consumption growth. But bank credit nowadays is created largely to finance
the transfer of property and financial assets – real estate, stocks and bonds.
Opposing the logic for running budget deficits
The Reagan-Bush
administration (1981-82) ran budget deficits not to pay for social spending,
but as a result of tax cuts, above all for real estate.[1] The resulting budget deficit led to proposed
“cures” in the form of fiscal cutbacks in social spending, starting with Social
Security, Medicare and education. This aim became explicit by the Clinton
Administration (1993-2000), and President Obama convened the Simpson-Bowles
“National Commission on Budget Responsibility and Reform” in 2010. Its name
reflects its recommendation that “responsibility” meant a balanced budget,
which in turn required that social spending programs be rolled back.
Opponents of
public spending programs saw the rise in government debt resulting from budget
deficits as providing a political leverage to enact fiscal cutbacks in spending. Many Republicans and “centrist” Democrats had
long sought a reason to scale back Social Security. Austrian and Chicago-School
monetarists urged that government shrink its activity, privatizing as many of
its functions as possible to let “the market” allocate resources – a largely
debt-financed market whose resource and monetary allocation would shift away
from governments to financial centers – from Washington to Wall Street, and in
other countries to the City of London, the Paris Bourse and Frankfurt. However,
no such critique was levied against military spending, and the government
responded to the 2000 dot.com and 2008 junk-mortgage financial crises by
enormous monetary subsidy and bailouts of the economy’s credit and asset
sector.
The Obama and Trump financial bailouts as a travesty
of MMT
To advocates of
MMT, and indeed to most post-Keynesian economists, the positive function of
budget deficits is to spend money and therefore income into the economy. And by
“the economy” is meant the production-and-consumption sector, not the financial
and property markets. That “real” economy could have been saved in a number of
ways. One way would have been to scale back mortgage debts (and debt service)
to realistic market prices and rent rates. Another would have been simply to
create monetary grants and subsidies to enable debtors to remain in their
homes. That would have kept the financial system solvent as well as employment
and existing home ownership rates.
But Obama
double-crossed his voters by not rolling out bad mortgage debts and other
obligations to realistic market prices, and instead bailing out the banks for
credit creation in the form of bad loans (“liars’ loans” to NINJA borrowers),
and bad financial bets on derivatives by brokerage firms that were designated
as “banks” in order to receive Federal Reserve credit and bailouts. With bank
balance sheets impairing their ability to create new credit, the government
stepped in by creating its own credit. This gave the banks, shadow banks and
other non-bank financial institutions a bonanza of credit – replete with the opportunity
to buy up foreclosed homes and create rental properties. This policy was
organized by Blackstone, and turned the crisis into an opportunity to make
enormous rates of return for its participants. The effect was to intensify the
economy’s polarization, as investors typically needed a minimum $5 million
tranche to join.
The Federal
Reserve’s $4.6 trillion in Quantitative Easing did not show up as money
creation, because it was technically a swap of assets – like Aladdin’s “new
lamps for old, in this case “good credit for junk.” The effect of this swap was
much like a deposit inflow. It enabled banks to ride out the downturn while
making a killing in the stock and bond markets, and to lend for takeover loans
and related financial speculation.
Wall Street’s Financial capture of MMT to inflate
asset prices, not revive the economy
At issue is how to
measure “the economy.” For the wealthy One Percent, and even the Ten Percent,
“the economy” is “the market,” specifically the market value of the assets that
they own: their real estate, stocks and bonds. This property and financial
wrapping for the “real” production-and-consumption economy has steadily risen
in proportion to wages and industrial profits. It has risen largely by
government money and credit creation (and tax breaks for property and finance),
along with its economic rent, interest and financial charges and service fees,
which are counted as part of Gross Domestic Product [GDP], as if they were actual contributions to the “real” economy.
So we are dealing
with two economic spheres: the means of production, tangible capital and labor
on the one hand (what is supposed to be measured by GDP), and the market for financial
and property assets, along with their rentier
charges that are taken from the
income earned by this labor and real capital.
Financial
engineering replaces industrial engineering – along with political engineering
by lobbyists seeking tax breaks, rent-extraction privileges, and government
subsidy. To increase property and financial asset prices and corporate
behavior, companies are drawing on credit and government subsidy not to
increase their production and employment, but to bid up their stock prices by
share buyback programs and high dividend payouts. Buybacks are called “repaying
capital,” so literally this policy is one of disinvestment, not investment. It
is favored by tax laws (taxing “capital” gains at a lower rate or not at all,
as compared to taxes on dividends).
The blind spot of vulgarized MMT: The FIRE sector vs.
the “real” economy
Much superficial
confusion between the FIRE sector and the production-and-consumption economy
comes from repeating the over-simplification of classical monetary formula
MV=PT, namely, dividing the economy into private and government sectors. Setting
aside the balance of payments (the international sector), it follows that
government spending will pump money into the domestic economy, and that
conversely, budget surpluses will suck money out.
The problem is
that this analysis, used by many MMTers, for instance, the Levy Institute’s
typical chart, does not distinguish between government spending into the FIRE
sector and asset markets as compared to spending into the “real” economy on
employment and production (including the building of public infrastructure, for
instance). Without this distinction it is not possible to see whether deficit
spending is productive by aiming at supporting employment and output, or merely
aims at supporting asset prices and making sure that creditors do not lose the
value of their financial claims on debtors – claims that have become unpayable
and thus are a bottomless pit of government deficit spending in the end.
Trying to keep the
financial sector and its debt overhead afloat implies imposing austerity on the
rest of the economy, IMF-style. So “MMT for Wall Street” is an oxymoron, and is
the opposite of MMT for a full employment economy.
MMT, public and private debt
Money is debt. Government
money creation for public purposes – to pay for employment and output – spurs
prosperity. But in its present form, private-sector debt creation has become
largely extractive, and thus leads to the opposite effect: debt deflation.
Governments can
pay public debt without defaulting, as long as this debt is denominated in
their own domestic currency, because the governments can always print the money
to pay. To the extent that public debt results from spending that supports
output, employment and growth, this process is not inflationary. The government
gives value to money by accepting it in payment of taxes. So the monetary
system is inherently bound up with fiscal policy. The classical premise of such
policy has been to minimize the economy’s cost structure by taxing mainly
unearned income (economic rents), not wages and profits in the
production-and-consumption sector.
The problem nowadays
is private debt. Most such debt is created by banks. This bank credit – debts
owed by bank customers – tends to increase faster than the ability of debtors
to earn enough income to pay it. The reason is that most of private debt is not
used for productive, income-generating purposes, but to finance the transfer
property ownership (affecting asset prices in proportion to the rate of credit
growth for such purposes). That use of credit – not associated with the
production-and-consumption economy – leads to debt deflation. Instead of
providing the economy with purchasing power (as in running government budget
deficits), private debt works over time to extract interest and amortization
from the economy, along with servicing fees.
The typical
mortgage, including its interest charges ends up exceeding the value that the
property seller received. As a result of compound interest, the mortgage debt
is repaid several times to the bank. The effect is to make banks the main
recipient of rental income (as mortgage debt service) and ultimately the main
beneficiaries of “capital” gains (that is, asset-price gains).
What gives bank
credit its monetary characteristics – and enables debt to be monetized as a
means of payment – is the government’s willingness to treat banks as a public
utility and guarantee bank deposits (up to a specified limit) and ultimately to
guarantee bank solvency.
A budget deficit resulting from a financial
bailout reflects the inability of the economy to carry its exponentially
growing debt overhead. Because this overhead increases as a result of the
mathematics of compound interest, the size of bailouts must increase – and with
it, the budget deficit (plus swap agreements) to subsidize this debt overgrowth
as an alternative to imposing losses by banks and financial investors.
That is what we
have seen since the financial crisis of 2008, both in Europe and the United
States. Led by the financial sector, much of the economic mainstream finally
has come to embrace the idea of budget deficits – now that these deficits are
benefiting primarily the financial and other parts of the FIRE sector, not the
population at large, that is, not the “real” economy that was the focus of
Keynesian economics and MMT.
This kind of
endorsement for government money creation thus should not be considered an
application of MMT, because its policy goal is almost diametrically opposite.
Much as the Reagan-era budget deficits were used as the first part of a one-two
punch to roll back social spending (Social Security, Medicare, education,
etc.), so today’s Obama-Trump deficits are being used to warn that the economy
must preserve fiscal “stability” by rolling back social programs in order to
bail out the financial economy. Wall Street magically has become transmogrified
into “the economy.” Labor and industry are viewed simply as deadweight
expenditures on the financial sector and its attempted symbiosis with the
central bank and Treasury.
The Financial Sector, Private Capital and Austerity
and Central Planning
If Wall Street is
bailed out once again at the expense of the “real” economy of production and
consumption, America will have turned decisively away from democracy into a
financial oligarchy. Ironically, the initial logic is the claim that an active
state is inherently less efficient than the private sector, and thus should be
shrunk (in the words of lobbyist Grover Norquist, “to a size so small that it
can be drowned in a bathtub”). But relinquishing resource allocation to the
financial sector leads to its product – that is, debt – creating a crisis that
requires unprecedented government intervention to “restore order,” defined as
saving banks and financial investors from loss. This can only be achieved by shifting
the loss onto the economy at large.
Today, the
financial sector – banks and financial investors – play the role that the
landlord did in the 19th century. Its land rents made Britain and
continental Europe high-cost economies, as prices exceeded cost-value. That is
what classical economics was all about – to bring market prices in lines with
actual, socially and economically necessary costs of production. Economic rent
was defined as unnecessary costs, which were merely payments for privilege: hereditary
landownership, and monopolies that creditors had carved out of the public
domain or won as legal compensation for financing public war debts.
The rentier class not only was the major
income recipient of the economic surplus, it controlled government, via the
upper house – the House of Lords in Britain, and similar houses across
continental Europe. Today, the Donor Class controls electoral politics in the United
States, via the Citizens United ruling. Political office has become privatized,
and sold to the highest bidders. And these are from the financial sector – from
Wall Street and financialized corporations.
The post-2008
stock market and bond-market boom raised the DJIA from 8500 to 30,000. This
gain was engineered by central bank support far in excess of what a “free
market” would have priced stock at. Before QE, U.S. shares had fallen only
slightly below the market average for the previous century. QE drove it to its
highest level outside the 1929 and 2000 bubbles. Even after the Coronacrash,
shares are still overpriced compared to pre-“Greenspan Put” prices.
The result is best
thought of as a blister, not a bubble. Its only hope of surviving without
bursting is for the government to continue to support it in the face of a
drastically shrinking post-coronavirus economy.
So the question is
what will be saved: The economy’s means of livelihood, or an oligarchy of
predators living in luxury off this shrinking livelihood?
All this was
explained by classical economists in their labor theory of value, which was
designed to isolate economic rent and other non-production overhead charges
(perceived to be mainly services in the 18th and 19th
century, especially by the wealthy classes).
The Hudson Paradox: Money, Prices and the Rentier
Economy
Without
distinguishing between the FIRE sector and the “real” economy there is no way
to explain the effects of government budget deficits on asset-price inflation
and commodity-price inflation.
Here is a seeming
paradox. Bank credit is created mainly against collateral being bought on
credit – primarily real estate, stocks and bonds. The effect of increasing
loans against these assets is to raise their prices – mainly for housing, and
secondarily for financial securities. Higher housing costs require new home
buyers to take on more and more debt in order to buy a home. Their higher debt
service leaves less disposable income to spend on goods and services.[2]
The asset-price
inflation effect of money creation by banks is thus to exert a downward impact on commodity prices, to
the extent that the carrying cost on bank credit reduces the net purchasing
power of debtors to buy goods and services. This deflationary effect of bank
money ends in a bad-debt crash, to which the government responds by bailing out
the financial sector with a combination of money creation and central bank
swaps (which do not appear as money creation). This is just the reverse of the
MV = PT tautology, which only measures the volume
of new money (M) without considering its use
– what it is spent on. By failing to distinguish the use of bank credit to buy
assets (hence, adding to asset-price inflation) as compared to government
deficit spending, both the old monetary formulae and the frequent MMT contrast
between public and private sectors neglect the need to distinguish the FIRE
sector’s “wealth and debt” transactions from how wages and profits are spent in
the production-and-consumption economy. The commercial banking system’s
“endogenous” money creation takes the form of credit at interest. The volume of
this interest-bearing debt grows exponentially, absorbing and extracting more
and more income from industry and labor. The effect on the overall economy is
debt deflation
It may be
epitomized as
Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day;
Teach him how to fish, and you lose a customer.
But give him a loan to buy a boat and net to fish, and he will end
up paying you all the fishes he catches. You have a debt servant.
[1] Real estate was
given a fictitiously short accelerated depreciation allowance – as if a
building lost its entire value in just 7½ years, providing all rental income to
be charged as an expense and even to generate a fictitious tax-accounting tax
loss. This catalyzed the great conversion of rental properties to co-ops.
Landlords (called “developers”) took out a mortgage equal to the entire market
price of the building, and then sold apartments at a price not only greater
than zero, but typically equal to the entire mortgage. It was one of the great
“wealth creation” ploys in modern history. And it was left out of the National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), which used “realistic” depreciation – which
still pretended that buildings were losing value, despite the maintenance and
repair expenditures to prevent such loss.
[2] Higher stock and bond prices lower the
yield of dividend income. (Most such income is spent on new financial assets,
not goods and services, so the effect of lower yields probably is minimal, and
may be offset by a “wealth effect” of higher asset prices and net worth.)
Tuesday, April 07, 2020
How can the UNCTAD $2.5 trillion coronavirus aid package to developing countries be financed at no cost to anyone?
The current SDR basket is as follows:
Recently, 1 U.S. Dollar has been around 0.73 SDR so let me fix this exchange rate for simplicity. With this assumption, the proposed UNCTAD coronovirus aid package would be 1.825 trillion SDR. Although there currently are 19 countries in the eurozone, since what I propose costs nothing to any country, I pick the largest eurozone economy, namely, Germany, to represent the eurozone in my description of the mechanism also for simplicity. It is up to the eurozone countries to decide how exactly to contribute their shares to the package, assuming that they agree with what I propose.
Note from the above table that 1.825 trillion SDR is the sum of below amounts in the component currencies:
What I propose is that the treasuries of the United States, Germany, China, Japan and the United Kingdom inject capital to the IMF by issuing zero-coupon perpetual bonds in their own currencies in the above respective amounts. I call these bonds the corona bonds. Since the IMF can maintain deposit accounts in the central banks of the above countries (in the case of Germany, in the European Central Bank), the IMF can sell the corona bonds to the central banks of the respective countries for increased balances in its deposit accounts for the respective amounts.
Hence, 1.825 trillion SDR is created for the IMF at no cost to these five countries and since the IMF deposits at these central banks are not reserves, there is no change in the base money of any of the countries.
Tuesday, March 24, 2020
Thursday, March 19, 2020
I was interviewed on Imran Kahn's international appeal to foreign creditors
My answers are in black.
This week Pakistan's Prime Minister Imran Khan issued an international appeal asking the developed countries to wave off debt of struggling economies such as Pakistan. He says that the impact of the coronavirus will make things difficult for developing countries in coming months.
I've been asked to write a story, which briefly explains if this is even possible.
It is not only possible but also a must. There is no alternative. TINA!
Is there any precedent for something like this where the developed countries have deferred or waived off part of their debt to poor countries in wake of calamity?
History is full of examples. Just look at West Germany as one example. How do you think West Germany has become one of the wealthiest countries after what happened to her during World War II? At the time, Germany was one of the largest debtors to foreign creditors. Leaving aside massive cancellations (about 90%) of domestic debts as part of the German Currency Reform of 1948 which made West German citizens and corporation to start from an almost clean slate, the London debt agreement of 1953 relieved West Germany from 51% of her foreign debt.
The London debt agreement between West Germany and 20 external creditors wrote off 46% of her pre-war debt and 52% of its post-war debt. The remaining was converted into long-term low-interest loans with a five-year grace period before repayment. Furthermore, Germany had to repay its debt only if it ran a trade surplus, and all repayments were limited to 3% of annual export earnings. Then came the economic miracle of West Germany. Why can we not do something similar for poor countries under current conditons? We must.
What would happen if countries like Pakistan which are dependent on exports to EU and US see a slowdown? What if remittances from the middle east go down?
Isn't answer to these questions obvious? Horrible things would happen. Imran Kahn explained to the foreign creditors what would happen very nicely. What more can I say?
Do you think Khan has a strong case here?
He has a very strong case. All developing countries should line up behind him and ask for debt relief from their foreign creditors including official creditors such as the IMF and the World Bank. Not only their public debts to their foreign creditors, but also the foreign debts of their non-financial private sectors must be restructured and large parts of all these debts must be written-off. As Michael Hudson always says, debts that cannot be paid will not be, so we better cancel those that cannot be paid.
Sunday, February 16, 2020
Muhteşem bir video (İngilizce) - Princes of the Yen
Japonya'ya da Türkiye'ye olanlar oldu. Yani, bırakın Türkiye'yi, o tarihlerde Japonya'ya da aynı şeyi yaptılar. İbret için izleyin.
Friday, February 14, 2020
Bir bankayı banka olmayan kurumlardan ayıran nedir?
Yasalardır tabii ki. Banka olmayan kurumlar ikiye ayrılır. Finansal olmayan kurumlar (FOK) ve banka olmayan finansal kurumlar (BOFK). Bu ikisini bir araya getip bunlara BOK diyelim. Lütfen ama bunu dışkı anlamına almayın. Kısaltma yalnızca.
BOKlar da, bankalar da 100 lira kredi verdiklerinde bilançoları şöyle değişir ilk aşamada:
VARLIKLAR l YÜKÜMLÜLÜKLER
____________________________________
Kredi + 100 l Tediye Hesabı + 100
——————————————————
Buraya kadar bir farklılık yok. Farklılık bir sonraki aşamada.
BOK:
VARLIKLAR l YÜKÜMLÜLÜKLER
____________________________________
Kredi + 100 l Tediye Hesabı 0
Kasa - 100 l
——————————————————
Toplam 0 l Toplam 0
Bu arada, tediye ödeme demek. Yani BOKlar tediye hesaplarındaki yükümlülüğü kasalarından ödemek zorundalar. Dolayısıyla, kredi verdiklerinde bilançoları büyümez. Yalnızca varlıklarının kompozisyonu değişir
Ama bankalar bu yasaya tabii değiller. Onlarınki şöyle ikinci aşamada.
BANKA:
VARLIKLAR l YÜKÜMLÜLÜKLER
____________________________________
Kredi + 100 l Tediye Hesabı 0
l Mevduat + 100
——————————————————
Toplam + 100 l Toplam + 100
Bunu nasıl yapabiliyorlar? Çünkü BOKların tabii oldukları yasalardan muhaflar ve tediye hesabının adını mevduata çeviriyorlar. Mevduat da paradır. Bankalar böyle para üretiyorlar ve kredi verdiklerinde bilançoları büyüyor. Bankaları da BOKlara uygulanan yasalara tabii kılın, bankalar da para üretemez hale gelirler, yalnızca finansal aracı olurlar ve ortalık karışır. O zaman parayı kim üretecek Hazine ve Merkez Bankası aralarında paslaşarak üretmezlerse?
BOKlar da, bankalar da 100 lira kredi verdiklerinde bilançoları şöyle değişir ilk aşamada:
VARLIKLAR l YÜKÜMLÜLÜKLER
____________________________________
Kredi + 100 l Tediye Hesabı + 100
——————————————————
Buraya kadar bir farklılık yok. Farklılık bir sonraki aşamada.
BOK:
VARLIKLAR l YÜKÜMLÜLÜKLER
____________________________________
Kredi + 100 l Tediye Hesabı 0
Kasa - 100 l
——————————————————
Toplam 0 l Toplam 0
Bu arada, tediye ödeme demek. Yani BOKlar tediye hesaplarındaki yükümlülüğü kasalarından ödemek zorundalar. Dolayısıyla, kredi verdiklerinde bilançoları büyümez. Yalnızca varlıklarının kompozisyonu değişir
Ama bankalar bu yasaya tabii değiller. Onlarınki şöyle ikinci aşamada.
BANKA:
VARLIKLAR l YÜKÜMLÜLÜKLER
____________________________________
Kredi + 100 l Tediye Hesabı 0
l Mevduat + 100
——————————————————
Toplam + 100 l Toplam + 100
Bunu nasıl yapabiliyorlar? Çünkü BOKların tabii oldukları yasalardan muhaflar ve tediye hesabının adını mevduata çeviriyorlar. Mevduat da paradır. Bankalar böyle para üretiyorlar ve kredi verdiklerinde bilançoları büyüyor. Bankaları da BOKlara uygulanan yasalara tabii kılın, bankalar da para üretemez hale gelirler, yalnızca finansal aracı olurlar ve ortalık karışır. O zaman parayı kim üretecek Hazine ve Merkez Bankası aralarında paslaşarak üretmezlerse?
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